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Resilience Over Dependence – Lessons from the Iran War and Ways Out of Global Vulnerability for German Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
- Fossil-based global economy systemically vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions
- Structural solution to this problem is known and technologically available
- Sustainable transformation begins with an honest analysis
- New opportunities for modernization and strategic realignment
The start of the military attacks by the U.S. and Israel on Iran on February 28, 2026, triggered major supply disruptions in the global oil market within a matter of days. As a result of the conflict, the daily shipment of crude oil and oil products through the narrow sea corridor has plummeted from an initial volume of around 20 million barrels to a minimum. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz¹, as well as the threat to the Suez Canal, are largely responsible for this.
Alternative transport routes are limited, while local storage capacities are filling up and reserves in oil-consuming nations are running low. As a result of full storage facilities, the Gulf states have cut their total oil production by at least 10 million barrels per day². Even if the conflict were to end immediately, global markets are only just heading toward the peak of the crisis. The total effects on the global economy are unfolding in several successive phases. Price increases, threats to global supply chains, and feedback effects are having a significant impact on the global economy, and Germany.
Some supply chains feel the consequences immediately, while for others the real problems only become apparent after weeks or even months. This structural threat only becomes evident once inventory levels have been depleted, key intermediate products are in short supply, and production processes have ground to a halt. It is precisely this time lag that makes the situation particularly risky, and highlights the urgency of strategic risk management and – closely linked to this – the relevance of sustainable transformation for companies.
Update April 9, 2026: Following the fragile US-Iran two-week ceasefire on April 08, 2026³ both Brent and WTI dropped roughly 13-16% in price, signaling positive global expectations. However, as markets continue to price in uncertainty, prices are still significantly above pre-crisis levels.
Continuous high-risk premiums, cautious routing, and ongoing geopolitical tensions mean the situation is far from normalized. While the Strait of Hormuz was effectively reopened, Iran imposed significant transit tolls on vessels, charging up to $2 million per tanker voyage in either yuan or crypto currency⁴.
Only selective exemptions apply, for example for China or Iraq. According to the ABC, seven ships transited the Strait yesterday. An ongoing trend like this exacerbates the hole in global supply chains. Furthermore, six out of these seven carriers held bulk cargo instead of oil⁵. Additionally, the active tensions with the Israeli strikes on Lebanon, already raise significant doubts of the success of the ceasefire by April 09. This crisis is far from over and economic impacts remain continuously high, which is once again reflected in price levels⁶.
The three phases
The impact of the ongoing conflict on businesses can be described in terms of three phases, of which the individual effects overlap:
- Phase 1: Immediate increases in oil and gas prices
- Phase 2: Global supply chain security
- Phase 3: Macroeconomic feedback loops
Phase 1: Immediate increases in oil and gas prices
In the wake of the attacks, there was a sharp, immediate rise in oil and natural gas prices. On Monday, March 30, 2026, the WTI price surpassed the $100 per barrel mark. Brent crude was trading at over $115 per barrel (as of March 30, 2026), reflecting additional risk premiums:
Chart 1: Price trend of Brent crude oil in March 2026⁷
Since the start of the conflict, oil prices have at times nearly doubled, while natural gas prices have risen less sharply by comparison. European natural gas futures climbed to €55.6 per MWh on March 30, 2026, marking a total increase of 73% over the course of March⁸:
Chart 2: TTF gas price trend in March 2026⁹
This price trend has a direct impact on electricity prices through the so-called merit-order principle: since gas-fired power plants in Europe are often the marginal price-setting power plants in the electricity market, any increase in the price of gas raises the marginal cost of electricity generation and, consequently, the overall market price for electricity¹⁰. However, the impact varies significantly across European countries. Countries with a high share of renewable energy are significantly less affected, as its gas-fired power plants are less likely to set prices. Countries with greater dependence on fossil fuels, such as parts of Eastern Europe or Italy, exhibit greater sensitivity of electricity prices to gas prices.
| Country | Spain | Germany | Hungary | Poland | Italy |
| Share of renewables in the electricity mix |
59% | 59% | 24% | 29% | 41% |
| Share of natural gas | 17,5% | 13,2% | 15,1% | 10,4% | 44% |
Table 1: Comparison of the electricity mix in European countries in 2024. Source: Statista
Companies that purchase electricity at spot market prices effectively pay the gas surcharge twice: once directly, as gas costs for their own gas consumption, and once indirectly, as electricity costs. Looking further ahead, both rising gas network fees (since fewer gas customers are paying for the existing infrastructure) and the upcoming ETS2 price¹¹ will drive up gas costs.
Fuel and heating oil prices are also closely linked to the price of crude oil. As a result of the Iran war, prices at the pump are rising in Germany. According to SWR’s analysis of fuel prices, on March 30, 2026, a liter of premium gasoline costs an average of 2.12 euros, E10 was priced at 2.06 euros per liter, and diesel at 2.27 euros.¹² Heating oil rose from just under 100 to 147 euros per 100 liters (as of March 30, 2026).¹³
Reduced direct dependence in Germany – yet still vulnerable
Following the invasion of Ukraine and the disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2022, Germany’s import structure has changed significantly. Nowadays, Germany meets most of its natural gas needs through supplies from Norway, which accounted for just under 44% of imports in 2025. Additionally, significant shares come from the Netherlands (24.2%) and Belgium (20.7%). Liquefied natural gas (LNG) currently accounts for only about 10% of imports, with the vast majority of that – around 96% – sourced from the United States. LNG supplies from the Arab region currently play only a minor role in the European energy mix.¹⁴
Figure 3: Germany’s natural gas imports in 2025
However, the currently low share of LNG from the Arab world does not mean that Europe is independent of this region. In the short term, Germany faces no threat of shortages of either fuel or natural gas. Contrary to Minister Reiche’s statements, Germany can still meet its own fuel needs.¹⁵ Furthermore, in line with the IEA’s recommendation, Germany is releasing part of its national oil reserves; a planned total of 2.64 million tons, which amounts to approximately 19.51 million barrels.¹⁶ Germany’s national gas storage facilities are at 22.2% (as of February 28, 2026). According to the Federal Network Agency, this has no impact on supply security.¹⁷ However, gas prices are being affected by the duration of the conflict. Thus, while there may not be a disruption, it could become very expensive for consumers by next winter.
However, in case of prolonged supply disruptions in the Persian Gulf, Asian buyers also increasingly turn to alternative sources. This creates direct competition with European buyers for available capacity, resulting in rising prices worldwide.¹⁸ These costs drive up energy and transportation prices globally.
Phase 2: Global Supply Chain Security
The conflict is also having further direct impacts on global product markets, as export traffic through the strait has also come to a standstill. Directly affected are all companies with supply chains passing through the Persian Gulf, as well as transport companies. The following chart from IMF Portwatch provides an overview of the next ports of call after the Strait of Hormuz and illustrates the global scale of this problem. If German companies have outsourced their supply chains to production facilities in Asia, the direct impact of the conflict increases significantly.
Graphic: Next port of call for tankers leaving the Strait of Hormuz in 2025¹⁹
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait also poses an acute threat to cargo ships and their crews due to attacks and threats by the Houthi militia. As an alternative route for shipments to and from Europe and America, the only viable option at present is the detour via the Cape of Good Hope. This typically extends transit times to an average of 20–30 days. In the current phase, due to the high volume of additional ships on this route, the voyage duration can extend to nearly 50 days.20
At the same time, bottlenecks are emerging in ports along the alternative routes, and the global shipping fleet is operating at higher capacity, which is driving freight rates even higher. Ships that arrive late cause further delays in their handling at the destination ports and thus also negatively impact subsequent transport. Insurers are also responding with significantly higher war risk surcharges or are even withdrawing insurance coverage.21 The result is longer transit times, higher costs, and an increased need for operational buffers along the supply chains.
For companies with tight just-in-time supply structures, longer delivery times are not only a cost issue, but also a production problem. At the same time, planning uncertainty is increasing, as short-notice route changes and volatile transit times are significantly undermining the reliability of global supply chains. The time lag in supply chains is also particularly critical: as soon as the ships currently still en route reach European ports and unload their cargo, a supply gap initially arises, as hardly any new ships are arriving from the affected region.
The Strait of Hormuz is an extremely important trade hub for aluminum products, construction materials, and agricultural products. The region is also a major exporter of fertilizers.22 The following charts show the volume of transit trade through the strait since December 24, 2025. Looking at the annual breakdown of ship types passing through the Strait, tankers accounted for approximately 60.5% of all ships in 2025, followed by bulk carriers (16.7%) and container ships (15.9%).23
Graph: Transit trade volume through the Strait of Hormuz, December 24, 2025, to March 17, 2026²⁴
The German Chemical Industry Association (VCI) warns of supply shortages for key (petrochemical) raw materials such as cyclohexane, glycol, melamine, and methanol, on which numerous production chains – for example, those for adhesives or solvents – depend on.25
Fertilizer production, and the closely related food industry, are also feeling the effects of the trade blockade. Producers use large quantities of natural gas as raw material; up to 70% of production costs are energy costs. Fertilizers, in turn, account for a significant portion of the costs of food production, which must be passed on to end customers and can also lead to shortages.26
Phase 3: Macroeconomic feedback
In its forecast of March 12, 2026, the ifo Institute considers two different scenarios for the development of the German economy:
The de-escalation scenario assumes a rapid end to the conflict and only temporary rises in crude oil and natural gas prices; therefore, moderate growth in real gross domestic product of 0.8% is expected for the current year and 1.2% for next year. This assessment is also largely in line with the ifo forecast from winter 2025. Had it not been for the energy price shock, slightly higher growth of around 1% would have been recorded for the current year.
In contrast, the escalation scenario assumes a significantly longer conflict with a sharper and more sustained rise in energy prices. As a result, the economic burdens will increase noticeably and amount to a total of 0.8 percentage points this year and next, compared to the pre-war scenario. With real GDP growth of just 0.6% and 0.8% this year and next, respectively, Germany’s economic recovery – which gained momentum in 2025 – will continue, albeit at a slower pace:
Table 2: Macroeconomic Indicators (ifo Institute Forecast for 2026 and 2027)²⁷
If the inflation rate remains elevated for a longer period – reaching just under 3% in the escalation scenario – the ECB is expected to respond with a tighter monetary policy. Corporate investment plans will be further dampened. Consumer demand will also decline as a result.
The German Economic Institute also simulates the development of German economic growth with negative effects. An oil price of $100 (€150) per barrel would result in a loss of real economic output of approximately €40 billion (over €80 billion in real terms) within two years.²⁸ This analysis does not take into account additional negative effects resulting from increasing geopolitical uncertainty; higher gas prices are considered only indirectly.
Dependence on fossil fuels
The pattern of past energy crises is always the same: a geopolitical event in a production or transit region triggers a wave of cost increases through global oil and gas prices, transportation costs, and supply chains, affecting companies across Europe regardless of their direct geographic exposure. This regularity is no coincidence. It is the systemic consequence of a global economy that has built its energy metabolism on fossil fuels, which are concentrated in a few regions and flow through geographical bottlenecks.
The latest research report from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) and the think tank Renewables First provides up-to-date evidence of the economic viability of the energy transition. Pakistan, which was previously heavily dependent on LNG and oil from the Arab region, has been able to increase its installed capacity of PV panels to over 51 gigawatts in recent years.
By February 2026 alone, the country has saved on oil and gas imports worth more than 12 billion U.S. dollars. According to the authors’ projections, Pakistan could save an additional $6.3 billion by the end of the year.29 Furthermore, at the time of these projections, the extent of the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz had not yet been factored in.
Dependence on fossil fuels poses a strategic risk for companies, one that materializes regularly and with significant consequences. Companies that reduce this dependence lower their vulnerability to the next geopolitical shock, regardless of where it originates. In this context, sustainability is evolving into a key business management tool. Sustainable transformation helps reassess cost structures, optimize energy and material flows, direct investments strategically, and identify potential risks early on.
Building resilience is the order of the day
Even the smallest company must understand that building a more resilient – meaning, more robust – value chain is no longer a secondary concern. It is also never just one measure, but rather various levers that need to be adjusted, to account for crises such as COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, or now the war in Iran, as well as the impacts of the climate crisis. Ultimately, every company must develop a comprehensive climate strategy for itself. Otherwise, vulnerability to unexpected events remains high. Especially when it comes to energy costs, a wide range of measures for sustainable transformation are already available:
- Increasing energy efficiency – energy that isn’t needed doesn’t have to be generated or
procured. - Electrification of all combustion processes – moving away from gas and oil. Although this can’t happen overnight, measures can be implemented step by step over the long term.
- Procurement of renewable energy – easiest locally, but green PPAs can also be integrated into electricity procurement to buffer price spikes.
- Expansion of battery storage – combined with commercial storage, grid load peaks can be reduced, self-generation optimized, and blackout protection for IT systems ensured.
- Establishing a circular economy – dependence on raw materials cannot be reduced to zero everywhere, but a higher recycling rate shortens supply chains, reduces purchase volumes, and minimizes dependencies. Around 40% of German companies that rely on intermediate products from abroad already consider themselves dependent on China.30
These measures are intended only to provide an overview – the possibilities vary too widely from one company to another. There are many positive real-world examples: heat pumps, solar power, biomass, geothermal energy, or even materials that were not previously considered recyclable (such as sportswear made from plastic bottles or houses built from reclaimed wood). In addition, the CO2 costs of the product or its manufacturing are also reduced. This mitigates further transition risks, as CO2 costs are set to rise significantly in the medium term – even though the regulations for ETS 2 (see also above) have been postponed by one year.
ESG reporting and carbon footprint assessment not only create transparency but also provide a reliable foundation for strategic decisions that directly influence operational processes. Reducing Scope 3 emissions is not just a climate policy goal but also an indicator of resilience: a supplier with a high share of renewable energy is a more stable, crisis-resistant partner. For international companies, there is also the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which imposes a CO2 tax on fossil fuel imports when they are brought into the EU.
Companies that decarbonize their supply chains early on not only protect themselves from energy price risks but also from rising CBAM costs—a twofold economic incentive for transformation.
Conclusion
The war in Iran demonstrates once again that the fossil-fuel-based global economy is systemically vulnerable to geopolitical disruptions. A conflict can double energy prices worldwide, paralyze global supply chains, and leave German small and medium-sized businesses facing significantly higher production costs, without even a single liter less of oil arriving in Germany itself.
The good news is that the structural solution to this problem is well-known and technologically feasible: energy efficiency, self-sufficiency through renewables, the electrification of fossil fuel combustion processes, and the diversification and decarbonization of supply chains, all of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable transformation. These measures are not ideological climate protection programs but rather risk management tools. They offer a demonstrable economic return on investment that pays off every time a geopolitical crisis drives up energy prices.
Sustainable transformation begins with an honest analysis of existing data and structures, proceeds through the development of clear strategic objectives, and ideally culminates in a roadmap that integrates technological, organizational, and cultural aspects. Especially in an industrially oriented country like Germany, this process opens new opportunities for modernization and strategic realignment. At its core, it is about proactively shaping one’s own future, which is precisely where the strategic value of sustainability lies. Companies that view transformation not as an obligation but as an opportunity to shape the future can reduce their dependence on external factors, strengthen their competitiveness, and make a significant contribution to the future viability of Germany as a business location.
We would be happy to provide you with comprehensive advice on all energy and sustainability topics. Please feel free to contact us with your inquiry.
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Sources and notes:
1 According to the IEA, around 25% of the world’s seaborne oil transport passes through the Strait of Hormuz. A good 80% of this is destined for Asia. In addition, about 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96% of the United Arab Emirates’ LNG exports pass through, representing 19% of the global LNG trade. The IEA records pipeline capacities for crude oil flows of 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day that can bypass the strait, which corresponds to approximately 25 to 33 percent of the normal volume.
2 https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a25ddf53-cd6c-4910-ac90-16bfd28399e7/-12MAR2026_OilMarketReport.pdf
3 https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce84z6y3ke4o
4 https://www.ft.com/content/02aefac4-ea62-48db-9326-c0da373b11b8?syn-25a6b1a6=1
5 Strait of Hormuz ship traffic remains at standstill despite Iran, US and Israel ceasefire | RNZ News
6 Brent crude oil – Price – Chart – Historical D
7 https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/brent-crude-oil
8 https://de.tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas
9 https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas
10 https://www.vattenfall.de/geschaeftskunden/ves/magazin/energie/irankonflikt-energiepreise
11 https://www.roedl.com/insights/ets-2-verzoegert-klimakosten-bleiben-warum-sie-nicht-auf-die-politik-warten-sollten-2/
12 https://www.swr.de/swraktuell/diesel-und-benzinpreise-aktuell-so-tanken-sie-heute-clever-100.html
13 https://www.heizoel24.de/heizoelpreise
14 https://www.vattenfall.de/geschaeftskunden/ves/magazin/energie/irankonflikt-energiepreise
15 https://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/service/benzin-und-diesel-gehen-uns-wirklich-sprit-und-heizoel-aus-a-3820485f-a48c-4ae6-80b3-77f83647cba7?giftToken=d30bbc49-27ac-48e6-85a1-50c33b47ec5e
16 https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/freigabe-oelreserven-deutschland-100.html
17 https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Gasversorgung/aktuelle_gasversorgung/start.html
18 https://www.vattenfall.de/geschaeftskunden/ves/magazin/energie/irankonflikt-energiepreise
19 https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cc317ba850e34c4dadbead6f7b336fb1
20 https://www.wtagroup.com/resources-and-insights/blogs/how-long-does-sea-freight-take#:~:text=North%20and%20South%20European%20export%20routes&text=Please%20note%2C%20with%20the%20ongoing,increased%20to%20nearer%2050%20days.
21 https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/weltwirtschaft/strasse-von-hormus-handelsrouten-oel-100.html
22 https://table.media/assets/briefings/security/documents/20260320_documents_ascii_research-brief_strait-of-hormuz.pdf
23 https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cc317ba850e34c4dadbead6f7b336fb1
24 https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cc317ba850e34c4dadbead6f7b336fb1
25 https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/schlaglicht-chemie-pharma.jsp
26 https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/how-does-iran-war-affect-fertiliser-supplies-prices-food-security-2026-03-17/
27 https://www.ifo.de/en/facts/2026-03-12/ifo-economic-forecast-spring-2026-consequences-of-iran-war-dampen-recovery
28 https://www.iwkoeln.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/galina-kolev-schaefer-thomas-obst-thomas-puls-samina-sultan-hoehere-oelpreise-koennten-deutschland-bis-zu-80-milliarden-euro-kosten.html
29 https://www.secureenergyproject.org/post/the-hedge-that-paid-off-how-pakistan-s-solar-boom-is-shielding-it-from-the-hormuz-crisis
30 https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/energiewende-studie-belegt-grosse-abhaengigkeit-von-china/100105929.html